Almost all democratic societies evolved socially and politically out of authoritarian and nondemocratic regimes, often as a result of revolutionary changes, illustrating the possibility of successful social evolution following major political changes. These changes not only altered the allocation of economic resources in society but also the structure of political power. Key actors demanding and agreeing to these political changes understood and cared about their short-term consequences, but not necessarily the entire sequence of events that they would unleash. In this paper, we develop a framework for studying the dynamics of political and social change that alter the balance of power in society, thus paving the way for future changes. The society consists of agents that care about current and future social arrangements and allocations which comprise of economic as well as social elements; allocation of political power determines which groups of agents have the capacity to implement changes in economic allocations and future allocations of power. Agents are forward-looking but discount the future so that they care only a limited amount about changes in the far future. The set of available social rules and allocations at any point in time is stochastic. We show that political and social change may happen without any stochastic shocks or as a result of a shock destabilizing an otherwise stable social arrangement. Crucially, the process of social change is "contingent" (and history dependent) in the sense that the timing and sequence of stochastic events determines the long run equilibrium social arrangements. For example, the extent of democratization may depend on how early uncertainty about the set of feasible reforms in the future is resolved.
Introduction
Almost all social, political and economic institutions we have around us have evolved over decades and sometimes over hundreds of years. For example, many scholars see the roots of British political institutions in the Magna Carta of 1215, which, under pressure from the barons, introduced the …rst formal restrictions on the authority of the monarchs and paved the way to the major political reforms in the 17th century culminating in the Glorious Revolution of 1688 and the Bill of Rights. The more recent wave of democratization in Britain started with the First Reform Act of 1832, which modestly extended the franchise. This was followed by a series of reforms gradually extending voting rights over the next three quarters of a century years …rst to a broader franchise of adult men and then to women. Both the protesters demanding change and the political elites that agreed to meet the social unrest and the demand of the disenfranchised in 1832 by adopting a modest extension of the franchise understood some of the consequences of these changes (see, for example, Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006) . The elites recognized that this was a costly move and that their monopoly of political power was eroding.
But they were as unlikely to foresee the sequence of events, including the repeal of the corn laws in 1846 or the arrival of universal mass su¤rage, unleashed by this reform as were the barons that forced King John to sign the Magna Carta to understand the importance of this document would have centuries later.
This brief description suggests that a satisfactory framework of social evolution should incorporate four key ingredients: 1 1. A game theoretic environment that centers around (social) con ‡ict: The roots of many major social, political and economic reforms lie in the demands that individuals and groups without social, political and economic rights make. Such demands, which were the driving force of most English, and then subsequently British, reforms, would be di¢ cult to comprehend without social con ‡ict. Social con ‡ict, in turn, necessitates a non-cooperative game theoretic analysis, which will be our starting point.
2. Strategic agents that understand and care about the consequences of their actions will have, at least in the near future: Without this feature, agents would act in a purely backward-looking manner. But a framework without any forward-looking elements would be both restrictive and would not enable us to capture to con ‡icts over social, political and economic institutions that centered about the near-term consequences of these institutions.
3. Limited discounting (or foresight) so that these agents do not simply care about what will happen in the very long run and are not unreasonably forward-looking: The barons that pushed for the Magna Carta cared greatly about what happened in the subsequent decade or perhaps two, but the consequences of the Magna Carta in 800 years would have meant little to them even if they could conceptualize its implications over such a long horizon. These features can be captured by assuming that participants of the game maximize discounted pro…ts with a discount factor less than (in fact, signi…cantly less than) one. While there is no limited foresight in such a dynamic game, limited discounting plays a similar role.
4. Stochastic events in the future: A framework in which all future events can be predicted perfectly would have di¢ culty in dealing with situations in which changes in economic and social circumstances in the future signi…cantly modify and augment the impact of past reforms and would not capture the contingent nature of social and political change.
Historically, unforeseen contingencies and stochastic shocks played an important role in the subsequent development of social and political reforms.
In this paper, we provide a general but tractable framework of social (and economic and political) evolution incorporating these four ingredients. The society consists of agents that care about current and future social rules and allocations (which comprise of economic as well as social elements). A change in social rules has not only direct e¤ects in terms of current allocations but also alters the balance of power in society and potentially impacts future social rules and allocations. We assume that discounting is limited, meaning that agents care about both the future and the present, and that the future set of possible social rules and allocations are stochastic, meaning that agents cannot perfectly foresee what options there will be the future (for example, the British political elites agreeing to a reform of the electoral system in 1832 could not have perfectly understood the subsequent demands that would be made by the Chartist movement).
We assume that the set of social rules and allocations can be represented by an "ordered"set, for example, by a set of rules that can be thought of as "less democratic"or "more democratic". This is a restrictive assumption, but together with a single-crossing-type assumption on stage payo¤s, it enables us to provide a sharp analysis of this rather general environment. In particular, under these and some additional, mostly technical assumptions, we prove that the dynamic game representing the process of social evolution always has a pure strategy equilibrium and we provide a fairly tight characterization of the structure of equilibria. We view this as a political model of social evolution since the extent of social change is determined and restricted by political equilibria, in particular, by concerns about how political power will shift as a result of possible social changes.
Social rules and allocations change in this framework when those who are currently (socially or politically) powerful agree to a change, even if this transfers power away from them. Social change may happen both without any stochastic shocks, because a single change in social rules or a sequence of changes are desirable, or it may happen as a result of a shock destabilizing an otherwise stable social arrangement. Yet, social change may fail to occur at times, even if it is "Pareto improving,"precisely because it may reduce the future power of the currently powerful.
We also show using a variety of examples how the set of possible equilibrium con…gurations are both history-dependent and contingent on the nature of stochastic events. For example, we show that the extent of democratization depends on how early uncertainty about the set of feasible reforms in the future is resolved. In particular, if agents assign su¢ ciently low probability to the possibility of further reforms, they may agree to reforms today. But if uncertainty about future reforms is resolved early and positively (meaning that it becomes "common knowledge" that such reforms will be possible in the future), this might discourage current reforms. Intuitively, current reform may correspond to a gamble for the political elites, with the downside being a process of further reforms reducing their political power and social status. If they think that such reforms are not feasible, they will be willing to agree to current reform, but if feasibility of such reforms is revealed too soon, this may increase their resolve against reform.
This reasoning illustrates how the exact sequence in which historical events transpire might have a major in ‡uence on social evolution. We also show how the threat of extreme reforms in the future might, somewhat paradoxically, facilitate current reform. This is because the threat of extreme reforms will make the "moderates"(e.g., the middle class) oppose further reforms in the future, and this may act as a guarantee to the current elites that the process of social change will not go too far. Another set of examples illustrate how the reform process might be hampered when agents are too forward-looking, whereas when they are relatively shortsighted or have low discount factors, the process of gradual reform may get underway and lead to long-ranging gradual changes.
We next provide a simple example to illustrate what kinds of situations can be studied using our framework and the types of results that emerge.
Example 1 Consider a society consisting of i = 1; :::; n agents. Suppose that lower-indexed agents are "richer"or more "aristocratic"than higher-indexed agents. Suppose that the society chooses one of s = 1; :::; S social rules, with higher-indexed social rules being "more democratic," or allocating greater social status to poorer and less aristocratic agents, than lower-indexed ones.
Social rules will lead to di¤erent types of economic, social and political relationships among the agents. Rather than modeling these in detail, we simply assign a stage utility u i (s) that agent i will obtain from social rule s. Each agent maximizes the discounted sum of stage utilities using the discount factor 2 (0; 1). Our single-crossing assumption is that u i (s) u j (s) is increasing in s whenever i > j. This implies that less aristocratic individuals are less averse to or more keen on more democratic social rules then more aristocratic ones. We impose some reasonable conditions on how political and social power is distributed under di¤erent social rules, loosely capturing the notion that higher-indexed social rules are more democratic. This may result from an explicit political process in which agents vote or bargain, or from social interactions giving more decision-making capacity to agents with greater social status. Finally, we model the stochastic nature of the environment by assuming that at time t only a subset of the states, 1; :::; ; s t are feasible, and additional states become feasible stochastically. So when elites agreed to the modest extension of the franchise in 1832, they may not have known for sure that future reform possibilities will present themselves (though, in our model, they understand that there is some likelihood of this event happening). This simple example can be used throughout the paper to illustrate our assumptions and results.
Our paper is most closely related to Roberts (1999) , Gomes and Jehiel (2005) , and our own previous work, in particular, Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2010a,b) . Roberts studies a dynamic model of club formation similar to Example 1 we just presented except that he assumes all decisions are made by majority voting within the current club and there are no stochastic elements (see also Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev, 2001 , for a related setup). We provide signi…cantly more general characterization results and allow for stochastic changes in the set of feasible clubs, which is crucial for our focus of modeling social evolution. 2 Gomes and Jehiel study a related environment with side payments. They show that a player may sacri…ce his instantaneous payo¤ to improve his bargaining position for the future, which is related to the unwillingness of winning coalitions to make transitions to non-stable states in our paper.
In Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2010a), we also study a similar model, but with two crucial di¤erences: …rst, the discount factor is taken to be large, so that only the long-run outcomes (when they are stable) matter, and second, there are no stochastic transitions. In Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2010b), we study political selection and government formation in a population with heterogeneous abilities and allow stochastic changes in the competencies of politicians, but these shocks are assumed to be very infrequent and the discount factor is again taken to be large, thus the key issues related to social evolution, which is our main focus in this paper, arise in none of these papers.
Our work is also related to models of franchise extension and political reform, including Acemoglu and Robinson (2000, 2006) , Lizzeri and Persico (2004), Laguno¤ (2006) , and to Barbera and Jackson's (2004) model of constitutional stability are on related themes as well. Finally, a variety of models of club and coalition formation can be viewed as special cases of our model (though in all cases without any stochastic elements). These include, in addition to Roberts (1999) and Barbera, Maschler, and Shalev (2001) , Burkart and Wallner (2000) , Jehiel and Scotchmer (2001) , Alesina, Angeloni, and Etro (2005) , and Bordignon and Brusco (2003) .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces our baseline model. Section 3 analyzes the structure of equilibria under the simplifying assumption that only onestep transitions are feasible (i.e., all changes have to be "gradual"). This assumption turns out to simplify the analysis considerably and enables us to obtain sharp results under weaker assumptions. In Section 4, we return to the general environment introduced in Section 2 and provide similar, though somewhat weaker, results on the structure of equilibria. In this section, we also provide additional characterization results on the structure of equilibrium transitions.
Section 5 provides several examples illustrating the contingent nature of social and political change. Section 6 concludes, while be Appendix contains all the proofs and further examples.
Baseline Model
Time is discrete and runs to in…nity. The society consists of n agents N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, which may be interpreted as groups or individuals, and there are m "social rules," which we will refer to as "states" for short, represented by the set S = f1; : : : ; mg. These social rules/states determine both current payo¤s and the distribution of social and political power in society. For concreteness, the reader may wish to focus on Example 1 discussed in the Introduction where individuals are ranked in descending order of how rich or "aristocratic" they are, and states correspond to how democratic the society is (in the sense of how democratically decisions are made) or to how much social status poorer or less aristocratic individuals have relative to richer or more aristocratic ones Formally, each state is characterized by the set of (stage) payo¤s that individuals receive in a period where the society is in that state, and also by the set of winning coalitions-coalitions of players that may decide to change the present state in favor of a new one. In particular, individual i obtains stage payo¤ u i (s) in state s 2 S. Denoting the state at time t by s t and the expectation at time t by E t , the expected discounted payo¤ of individual i at time t can be written as
where 2 (0; 1) is the common discount factor. Throughout, we impose the following increasing di¤ erences (single crossing) assumption on stage payo¤s.
Assumption 1 (Increasing Di¤ erences) For any agents i; j 2 N such that i > j,
is increasing in s (on S). coalitions that include i. More speci…cally, we refer to nonempty subsets X of N as a coalition, and we denote the set of coalitions by C. Each state s is associated with a subset W s of C. We impose the following relatively mild and natural assumptions on the set of winning coalitions.
Assumption 2 (Winning Coalitions) For any given s, the set of winning coalitions W s satis…es:
The …rst part of this assumption states that if a coalition has the capacity to implement social or political change, then a larger coalition (including the initial coalition) will also have this capacity. The second part ensures that if some coalition has the capacity to implement change, then the remaining players (its complement) does not have this capacity. Finally, the third part (which in light of part 1 is equivalent to stating that N 2 W s ) ensures that there are no exogenously stable states: if all players want to implement a change, this will happen.
We strengthen this assumption further to capture the idea that higher-indexed states, corresponding to "more democratic" states in terms of the example in the Introduction, give less power to "more aristocratic" individuals. To formalize this notion, we introduce the following de…nition.
De…nition 1 (Quasi-Median Voter) Player i 2 N is a quasi-median voter in state s if for any winning coalition X 2 W s , min X i max X.
De…nition 1 is adopted from Acemoglu, Egorov, and Sonin (2010a) . Given that Assumption 2.1 requires that any superset of a winning coalition is a winning coalition, it is equivalent to assuming that player i is a quasi-median voter if he is a member of any connected winning coalition in s (i.e., any coalition X that may be de…ned as follows: there exist some a; b 2 N such that j 2 X , a j b The following are examples that satisfy all the assumptions imposed so far.
Example 2 Consider the problem of voting in clubs, where a club is a subset of the society.
Each individual i receives a stage payo¤ w i (s t ), which is as a function of the current club s t , and current club members decide (according to some voting rule) tomorrow's club s t+1 . Roberts (1999) studies a special case of this environment, where individuals are ordered, i = 1; 2; :::; N , any club s t must take the form x k = f1; :::; kg for some k = 1; 2; ::; N , and there are no stochastic elements.
In particular, Roberts (1999) imposes the following (strict) increasing di¤erences condition:
which is equivalent to Assumption 1, and considers two voting rules: majority voting within a club (where in club x k one needs more than k=2 votes for a change in club size) or median voter rule (where the agreement of individual (k + 1) =2 if k is odd or k=2 and k=2 + 1 if k is even are needed). These two voting rules lead to corresponding equilibrium notions, which Roberts calls Markov Voting Equilibrium and Median Voter Equilibrium, respectively. He establishes the existence of mixed-strategy equilibria with both notions and shows that they both lead to the same set of stable clubs.
Roberts's two voting rules can be represented by the following sets of winning coalitions:
= fX 2 C : jX \ x k j > k=2g , and
satisfy Assumption 2. Finally, under both voting rules, the set of quasi-median voters is the same, and satis…es the monotonicity requirement of Assumption 3 (as well as Assumption 4 below).
With a slight reinterpretation, the same formalism can also be used to model the evolution of social status. Suppose that lower-indexed individuals correspond to those who are at a higher rank in the social hierarchy (e.g., agent 1 could be the king, agent 2 is a duke, agent 3 is another high status aristocrat, and so on). Di¤erent social arrangements are captured by the states denoted by the set S and higher-indexed states correspond to situations in which less aristocratic individuals have greater social status. This would naturally imply a structure of stage payo¤s that satis…es Assumption 1. Social arrangements change as a result of a process that can be captured as a "social-status-weighted" voting, in the sense that the votes of higher status agents count for more. This implies that more aristocratic agents will have greater say in lower-indexed states, so that Assumption 3 would be satis…ed.
Our next example demonstrates that this structure also captures the political dynamics associated with taxation decisions.
Example 3 Situations where individuals have preferences over their incomes and the level of public good provision and those in power can determine both the tax rate used for …nancing public good provision and the extent of voting franchise in the future also naturally …t our framework. Suppose, for example, that the agents are ordered by their income, from the most productive to the least productive, and a fraction of those who is more productive have political power to decide on the tax level and the level of franchise extention. Both types of decisions are made by an absolute majority rule of those who are enfranchised. For each k; in state x k = f1; 2; : : : ; kg (k most productive individuals are enfrachised) winning coalitions take the form
The payo¤ of individual i is given by
where A i is individual i's productivity with A i > A j for i < j, E denotes the expectations operator, and s j is the tax rate determined when the voting franchise is s j . When an odd number of individuals are allowed to vote, the tax rate is determined by the median. When there is an even number of voters, each of the two median voters, the left median and the right median, gets to set the tax rate with equal probability; thus, the need for expectations operator in (2). Finally, G s j = h P k l=1 s j A l is the amount of public good provided through taxation, where h is an increasing concave function.
The ideal point of individual i's preferences over the tax rate in state x l is a solution to the following maximization problem.
This implies that individual i would choose i that satisfy the following equation:
From the concavity of h it follows that for i < j, i > j . Naturally, more productive individuals prefer lower tax rates. Now let us consider a one-step extension of the franchise, i.e. transition from x l to x l+1 .
Then, with probability 1 2 , the tax is set by the left median x l+1 ; who is either same individual who set the tax rate in x l or less productive than her (if in x l the tax rate was set by the left median), in which case the tax rate is at least as high in x l+1 as in x l .and with probability 1 2 , by a less productive individual, in which case the tax rate is greater in x l+1 than in x l . Therefore,
which implies that
Now, adding the equilibrium levels of public goods, G x l and G x l+1 , to both sides of the above inequality, we get that for any i < j 2 I and any x l ; x l+1 2 S,
which satis…es Assumption 1.
We next return to the general framework and introduce stochastic shocks. To keep the model tractable, we assume that at each date t; the set of available states is L t = fl t ; : : : ; r t g, i.e., the set of feasible states is always assumed to be connected. New states, l t 1 and r t +1 are assumed to become available stochastically at the beginning of period t with probabilities p l Lt and p r Lt , respectively.
The …nal aspect of the dynamic game left to be described is a set of protocols. A protocol s for state s is a …nite sequence of players s 1 ; : : : ; s Ks (possibly with repetitions) such that for any player i 2 N , s k = i for some k 2 f1; : : : ; K s g. This last condition assures that each player has a chance to be the agenda-setter in each state.
The timing of each period is as follows.
1. Period t begins with state s t 1 inherited from the previous period (where s 0 is exogenously given).
2. With probability 1 p l
, the set of available states stays the same (L t = L t 1 ), otherwise it expands to the left, right, or to both sides.
3. Players become agenda-setters, one at a time, according to the protocol s t 1 . Agendasetter i proposes an alternative, a t;i 2 L t .
4. All players vote sequentially over the proposal a t;i (e.g., we can assume that the voting sequence is 1; 2; :::; n, though any deterministic or stochastic sequence would also give identical results). If the set of players that support the transition, Y , is a winning coalition (i.e., Y 2 W s t 1 ), then s t = a t;i , i.e., a transition to a t;i takes place. Otherwise, the next person makes the proposal, and if the last agent in the protocol has already made a proposal and no proposal has been accepted, then s t = a t;i .
Each player i gets instantaneous utility u i (s t ).
We are interested in Markov Perfect equilibria of the above game.
In the next section, we start with a simpli…ed version of this game, which will enable us to obtain somewhat sharper results and clarify workings of a dynamic game.
Analysis of One-Step Transitions
In this section, we introduce an additional restriction and assume that only one-step transitions are allowed. Technically, this implies that any alternative a t;i proposed by any individual i at time t must not only belong to the set of feasible states L t , but also lie in fs t 1 1; s t 1 ; s t 1 + 1g. The society can still reach states further away from the status-quo, but this will have to be by moving step-by-step, i.e., in several steps. Therefore, this assumption explicitly requires the evolutionary path to be gradual. We will relax this assumption the next section.
Next, we introduce several key de…nitions that will be used both in this and the next sections.
De…nition 2 (Transition Mapping) Consider the game above, with protocol f s g s2S and
MPE
in pure strategies. Mapping L : S ! S is referred to as the transition mapping corresponding to equilibrium and the set of available states L if, whenever s t 1 = s and
The next de…nition introduces an important property of transition mappings which we will use throughout the analysis.
Another relevant property of transition mappings is acyclicity. We say that a transition mapping is acyclic if states do not repeat on non-trivial paths de…ned by the mapping. Formally,
Although cyclic transition paths are both unintuitive and generally unrealistic, we show in Example 12 in the Appendix that they may exist. Clearly, monotone transition mappings are acyclic. Our next result shows that transition mappings are necessarily monotone when only one-step transitions are allowed; we will also show that equilibria leading to such mappings exist when general transitions are allowed. In light of this, cyclic mappings are of limited interest.
In addition to transition mappings, we also study properties of transition paths. Transition
Note that in the de…nition of monotonic paths, we are using the same set of available states. Thus, monotonic paths do not imply that monotonicity is preserved after the set of available states changes. In view of this, it is straightforward to see that when the transition mapping L is monotone, it induces monotonic paths. This means, in particular, that the evolution of the state of the world between two shocks is necessarily monotone. Indeed,
. After a shock, as Example 7 shows, the direction may change.
Some of our results hold not for all, but for "almost all" possible con…gurations of stage payo¤s. To formalize notion, we say that some statement is held generically if it is true for all combinations of payo¤s fu i (s)g s2S i2N , except, perhaps, for a set of Lebesgue measure zero. We now formulate our …rst result.
Proposition 1 Suppose that only one-step transitions are allowed. Then:
1. For any set of protocols f s g s2S and any initial state s 0 , there exists a Markov Perfect equilibrium of the game in pure strategies.
2. Generically, any pure strategy Markov Perfect equilibrium induces monotonic transition mappings L for every set of available states L S. Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 1 provides a full characterization for the model in which only one-step transitions are allowed. In particular, it provides an existence result (the proof of which involves both recursive and constructive elements). In a nutshell, we …rst construct an equilibrium for the situation where all states have become available (i.e., L t = S for any t), which has monotonic transition mapping. The monotonicity of the mapping implies that increasing di¤erences not only hold for stage payo¤s but also for continuation values. This allows us to use the following inductive argument. Iterate by one step to the situation where only one state is not available yet, and assign payo¤s to di¤erent states which are linear combinations of stage payo¤s in the current state and continuation values following a possible shock (which we already know by induction).
The linear combinations are such that the increasing di¤erences condition is preserved, and thus we can apply the same argument in a situation in which two states are not available yet, and so on.
The second part provides a characterization result. It shows that all equilibria have a simple and intuitive structure. In particular, generically, all equilibria can be represented by monotone transition mappings. By de…nition, this ensures acyclicity and also implies that equilibrium paths are monotonic. An immediate implication of part 2 of this proposition is that each nonmonotonic switch in the observed evolution of states is a result of a shock.
The third part establishes another intuitive property of equilibria. It implies that at any stage in the game there can only be transition to states that are Condorcet winners in the sense that if there is a transition from state s to s 0 , then it is the case that for all currently feasible s 00
we have V (s 0 ) > V (s 00 ) for a winning coalition. 3 Thus, we can only think of transitions that are supported by coalitions of individuals that are powerful given the current social arrangement.
While intuitive, this feature is not guaranteed in general, as the fear that some proposal that will be made and accepted in a later proposal may make a winning coalition accept a transition that is dominated by some other feasible transition.
Finally, the fourth part establishes the uniqueness of the transition mapping, provided one of two (or both) additional assumptions hold. While theoretically restrictive, these assumptions hold in a number of applications, and the uniqueness result is therefore applicable to these applications. 4 Example 10 in the Appendix shows that the result may fail if both additional assumptions are violated.
Analysis of General Transitions
We now relax the assumption that only one-step transitions are allowed and study Markov
Perfect equilibria of the general environment described in Section 2. In this more general version, in contrast to the results shown in Proposition 1 for one-step transitions, we need to impose additional assumptions and our results are somewhat weaker. This is for several reasons. First, as
Example 11 in the Appendix shows the existence of pure strategy equilibria cannot be guaranteed without further assumptions. Furthermore, Example 12 in the Appendix shows that cyclic transition paths can also arise in equilibrium (and Example 13, also in the Appendix, shows that there may be equilibria with nonmonotonic transition paths). These examples demonstrate the analogues of the results in Proposition 1 do not hold without the restriction to one-step transitions. As a …rst step towards the characterization of equilibria when general transitions are possible, we …rst strengthen Assumption 3.
Assumption 4 ensures that, as the state becomes lower, the power of poor players increases and the power of rich players decrease as in the following sense: if a coalition of k richest players is blocking for some state of the world, then for all lower states (i.e., states that favor powerful players), it is even winning. Likewise, if a coalition of k poorest players is blocking in some state of the world, it is winning in all higher states. More restrictive than Assumption 3, this assumption holds in almost all interesting applications, including the main examples presented so far. We therefore believe that it does not lead to much loss of generality.
Under Assumption 4, the following characterization result for the general model in Section 2 applies.
Proposition 2 If transitions to any available states are allowed, and Assumption 4 holds, then:
1. For any set of protocols f s g s2S such that s Ks 2 M s , for any set of available states L S and any initial state s 0 , there exists a Markov Perfect equilibrium of the game in pure strategies such that its transition mapping L is monotone.
2. Suppose that for some set of protocols f s g s2S , mapping L is a monotone transition mapping corresponding to some MPE starting from the set of available states L S.
Then L consists of Condorcet winners: for any s, there does not exist a winning coalition in s and s 0 2 L such that V (s 0 ) > V ( (s)) for all members of this coalition.
3. Conversely, suppose that for some set of protocols f s g s2S , mapping L is the transition mapping corresponding to some MPE with current set of available states L S, and L consists of Condorcet winners. Then, generically, L is monotone.
4. For any two MPE which induce monotonic transition mappings, the transition mappings are the same whenever every set of quasi-median voters is a singleton.
Proposition 2 provides similar results to those of Proposition 1 under the somewhat stronger Assumption 4. In addition, Part 1 of this proposition imposes that the last player to make the proposal in any state is always one of the quasi-median voter is in that state. Without this additional condition, a pure strategy equilibrium can fail to exist as shown in Example 11 in the Appendix.
This proposition is important as it enables us to study general transitions. In particular, in the context of the application of voting over social rules, this proposition enables us to give a general characterization of the set of equilibria without the restriction that only one-step transitions are possible.
We next provide further results on transition paths, which apply either when we only allow one-step transitions (following on Proposition 1 in the previous section) or when we allow general transitions but also impose the conditions in Proposition 2 so as to ensure the existence of pure strategy equilibria.
Proposition 3 Suppose that either only one-step transitions are allowed and the conditions in Proposition 1 hold or that general transitions are allowed and the conditions in Proposition 2 hold. Then: generically, the evolution of states has a limit state s 1 (meaning that as t ! 1, s t converges almost surely to some s 1 ). The limit state s 1 potentially depends on the timing and sequence of shocks.
This proposition implies that, despite stochastic shocks, the process of social evolution will lead to a limit state. Intuitively, without any shocks, the monotonicity of transition paths ensures convergence to such limit state. When there are shocks, they will ultimately lead to the entire set feasible states being available (L = S), and then monotonicity again ensures convergence.
The next proposition shows that the addition of a new high state does not lead to a transition towards a lower state and the addition of and low state does not lead to the transition towards a higher state. It also derives an implication of this observation on what types of transition paths can be ruled out (when we also take into account stochastic shocks). In particular, it shows that when higher index states are becoming available, equilibrium paths (taking stochastic shocks into account) cannot have inverse U-shaped parts.
Proposition 4 Suppose that either only one-step transitions are allowed and the conditions in Proposition 1 hold or that general transitions are allowed and the conditions in Proposition 2
hold. In addition, suppose that either (a) preferences are single-peaked or (b) all sets of quasimedian voters are singletons. Then:
1. Suppose that given the currently available set of states L t 0 = fl t 0 ; r t 0 g, transition paths have stabilized at time t, i.e." s t = s t 1 = s t 2 . Then, following a shock that adds a higher-indexed state at time t so that L t = fl t 1 ; r t 1 + 1g, there cannot be a transition to a lower state, i.e., s t 0 s t for all t 0 such that L t 0 = L t (while a transition to a higher state is possible). Similarly, following a shock that adds a lower-indexed state at time t so that L t = fl t 1 1; r t 1 g, there cannot be a transition to a higher state, i.e., s t 0 s t for all t 0 such that L t 0 = L t (while a transition to a lower state is possible).
2. Suppose that l t = 1 (i.e., initially, all low states are available, and only high states may be added) and that shocks are su¢ ciently rare (so that between shocks, transition paths stabilize with high probability). Then, transition paths are either monotonic or U-shaped, but inverse U-shaped parts are impossible (i.e., if for some t, s t s t 1 , then s t+1 s t ). Similarly, if r t = m (i.e., only low states may be added), then transition paths are either monotonic of inverse U-shaped, but do not have U-shaped parts (i.e., if for some t, s t s t 1 , then s t+1 s t ).
An important question with general transitions is whether equilibrium transition paths will still involve gradual changes (of the sort imposed in our analysis of one-step transitions) or whether there will be an immediate change to the limit state (which always exists by Proposition 3). The next example shows that regardless of the discount factor, equilibria may involve gradual change. This example contrasts with the results in Acemoglu, Egorov and Sonin (2010a,b) ,
where, under additional assumptions, the equilibrium always involved immediate changes to the limit state.
Example 4 Consider a society consisting of two players and three states, with the payo¤s given by the following matrix s 1 s 2 s 3 Player 1 10 20 15 Player 2 10 0 20
Suppose also that player 1 is the dictator in state s 1 , while player 2 is the dictator in states s 2 and s 3 . Player 2 prefers state s 3 , so any transition to state s 2 will lead to state s 3 in the next period. But since player 1 prefers both s 2 and s 3 , she would prefer to transition to either. Because she prefers s 2 to s 3 , for any discount factor she would receive higher utility by …rst transitioning to s 2 and then having player 2 implement a transition to s 3 . This example does establish that for any discount factor transitions might be gradual. It is also straightforward to construct examples where for any discount factor, equilibrium transitions are immediately to the limit state.
Timing of Shocks, Contingency and Social Evolution
In this section, we illustrate the role of "contingency"in social evolution, meaning that we show how the exact timing and sequence of shocks matters for the ultimate outcome of social evolution.
We illustrate the main results using a series of examples. Throughout, for concreteness, we focus on the environment introduced in Example 1 and also suppose that we start in the least democratic/most aristocratic state, s 1 , and in this state, we have the dictatorship of player 1, who is thus the unique quasi-median voter in this state, i.e., M 1 = f1g.
Example 5 (Early shocks may make reforms more di¢ cult) Suppose that S = fs 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 g and we start with the set of feasible states, L 0 = fs 1 ; s 2 g. Suppose also that s 2 corresponds to limited democracy and a change to this state will shift political power away from player 1. Let player 2 to be the quasi-median voter in s 2 , i.e., M 2 = f2g. Finally, suppose that u 2 (s 3 ) > u 2 (s 2 ) and u 1 (s 3 ) < u 1 (s 2 ), so that player 2 would prefer transition towards a more democratic state s 3 if such transition were feasible, but this transition is disliked by player 1.
For instance, we can think of player 1 as corresponding to the king or to the aristocracy and being in favor of limited democracy, but disliking full democracy (see Acemoglu, Egorov and Simon 2010a, for a more detailed discussion of this example). Suppose that is su¢ ciently high so that when L = fs 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 g, player 1 prefers to maintain s 1 (since a change to s 2 will immediately induce a change to s 3 , which he dislikes).
Yet when we start with L 0 = fs 1 ; s 2 g and the probability that the set of feasible states will expand to L = fs 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 g ; p; is less than 1, the situation is potentially di¤erent. For p su¢ ciently low, player 1 would be in favor of a switch to s 2 , since she would expect that a society will spend a long time in this state. Now suppose that there is an early shock, meaning that s 3 becomes available at time t = 0. This early shock make the entire reform process more di¢ cult and discourages player 1 from accepting the change to s 2 . In terms of the discussion of democracy in the British context in the Introduction, an early shock would correspond to the elite believing in 1832 that there will be very rapid reform towards much more inclusive franchise immediately. If many members of the elite supported the reforms of 1832 with the understanding that these would be relatively stable, such a shock may have made them less willing to accept the more modest reforms of 1832 in the …rst place.
Example 6 (Patience may make matters worse) Consider the same environment as in the previous example, but with L 0 = fs 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 g, so that there is no room for new states becoming available. When is close to 1, player 1 does not wish to accept the eventual switch to s 3 , and thus state s 1 will persist. But if is su¢ ciently small, then the transitory gain from the change to s 2 is su¢ cient to compensate player 1 for the lower utility from s 3 . In this example, when players are more forward-looking and more patient, the reform becomes more di¢ cult.
This example also illustrates that the process of social evolution implied by our model need not be Pareto e¢ cient. When the discount factor is close to 1, the unique equilibrium involves the society remaining in state s 1 even though all agents are strictly better o¤ in state s 2 .
The reason why such Pareto improving change does not take place is that once this transition is implemented, political power shifts away from player 1 to player 2, who will then have an incentive to implement a further change to state s 3 , which is disliked by player 1. Thus, it is the inability of player 2 to commit to not implementing deferred or changed that leads to the Pareto e¢ cient outcome.
Example 7 (Shocks may make reform easier) We now illustrate how, in contrast to Example 5, shocks may also make reform easier. Suppose that S = fs 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ; s 4 g and we start with the set of feasible states, L 0 = fs 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 g. Suppose also that M 2 = f2g and M 3 = M 4 = f3g. Finally, suppose that u 2 (s 3 ) > u 2 (s 2 ) > u 2 (s 1 ) > u 2 (s 4 ) and u 1 (s 4 ) < u 1 (s 3 ) < u 1 (s 1 ) < u 1 (s 2 ), and u 3 (s 4 ) > u 3 (s 3 ) > u 3 (s 2 ) > u 3 (s 1 ). One interpretation is that s 4 is an extreme antiaristocratic regime, for example corresponding to communism or some form of radical populism. This is disliked both by player 1 and player 2. Initially, state s 4 is not feasible. Suppose that it becomes feasible with some small probability p at each date (regardless of the current state).
If p is su¢ ciently small, player 2 will opt to move from state s 2 to state s 3 (reasoning that s 4 is unlikely to become feasible and thus s 3 is likely to persist). But since s 3 is disliked by player 1, this means that player 1 prefers to stay with s 1 . However, when state s 4 becomes available, player 2 will no longer choose to transition from s 2 to s 3 . Given this, player 1 would be happy to transition to s 2 . In this case, the shock that made state s 4 available, for example, the organization of a strong socialist or populist party, will make the initial step of reform more likely.
Example 8 (The order of shocks matters for the reform process) Suppose again that S = fs 1 ; s 2 ; s 3 ; s 4 g, but we now start with the set of feasible states, L 0 = fs 2 ; s 3 g, and current state s 2 with M 2 = f2g. We can interpret this as the society starting with a weak monarchy, dominated by the aristocracy, and the only feasible transition is to constitutional monarchy; a transition to either absolutist monarchy or full democracy are not feasible at …rst. We again
. Both s 1 and s 4 become available with probability p at each date. Now for p su¢ ciently small and su¢ ciently small, if neither s 1 nor s 4 is available at the …rst date, player 2 will transition to s 3 . If s 1 becomes available at the …rst date, then player 2 will transition to s 1 immediately. If s 4 becomes available at the …rst date, then player 2 will not want to transition to s 3 , and will wait for s 1 to become available. Thus the exact timing of di¤erent types of shocks will determine both the timing of transitions and the ultimate limiting state.
Conclusion
Almost all democratic societies have evolved socially and politically out of authoritarian and nondemocratic regimes. This evolution has often been a result of intense political and social con ‡ict and even revolutionary changes, and thus illustrates the possibility of successful social evolution following major political changes. These changes not only altered the allocation of economic resources in society but also the structure of political power. Key actors demanding and agreeing to these political changes understood and cared about their short-term consequences, but not necessarily the entire sequence of events that they would unleash.
In this paper, we developed a framework for studying dynamics of political and social change that alter the balance of power in society, thus paving the way for future changes. The society consists of agents that care about current and future social arrangements and allocations which comprise of economic as well as social elements; allocation of political power determines which groups of agents have the capacity to implement changes in economic allocations and future allocations of power. Agents are forward-looking but discount the future so that they care only a limited amount about changes in the far future. The set of available social rules and allocations at any point in time is stochastic.
We showed that political and social change may happen without any stochastic shocks or as a result of a shock destabilizing an otherwise stable social arrangement. Crucially, the process of social change is "contingent"(and history dependent) in the sense that the timing and sequence of stochastic events determines the long run equilibrium social arrangements. For example, the extent of democratization may depend on how early uncertainty about the set of feasible reforms in the future is resolved.
Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Part 1. The proof consists of three main parts. First, we consider a game without stochastic shocks, i.e., we assume that L 0 = S from the beginning. We take a protocol f s g s2S and construct a certain monotonic mapping ; this part of the proof will be formulated so as to make it immediately applicable to the proof of existence in the general version of the game, in which general transitions are allowed (Part 1 of Proposition 2). Second, we prove that this mapping may indeed be supported as a MPE of the game with the given protocol. This will complete the proof for the deterministic case. Third, we extend the proof to allow the possibility of stochastic shocks.
Step 1: Construction of mapping .
The construction scheme is recursive in the following sense. Suppose we have already de…ned mapping for two states a; b 2 S (where a < b) in such a way that (a) = a and (b) = b. Then the procedure either de…nes mapping for all states s 2 (a; b), or it identi…es a state c 2 (a; b)
where it sets (c) = c, and then performs the same procedure for the two smaller intervals (a; c) and (c; b).
For the procedure to start, let us extend the set of states by adding two additional states 0 and m+1, and de…ning utilities u i (0) and u i (m + 1) in a way that (a) max (u i (0) ; u i (m + 1)) < min s2S u i (s) (i.e., the new states yield lower utilities for each player i than any of the original states in S), and (b) Assumption 1 is satis…ed. It is clear that such utilities may be chosen. Now, let (0) = 0 and (m + 1) = m + 1, so that the algorithm gets started. The idea is to start the algorithm, but at the same time make sure that players will never want to transit to the new states from other states, as this will give them a low utility forever. Notice that it is easy to construct a game where these two new states will indeed be stable: it would su¢ ce to add two new players, 0 and n + 1, who will be dictators (i.e., any coalition that includes them will be winning) in the new states 0 and m + 1, respectively, and who will have no say (i.e., a coalition that includes them is winning if and only if it would be winning without them) in all other states, and, moreover, whose uniquely favorite states are 0 and m + 1, respectively.
In this case, the game will never move away from states 0 and m + 1, so setting (0) = 0 and (m + 1) = m + 1 would be reasonable. However, for the purposes of the proof, we do not need the two new players, and hence proceed with the same set of players N , albeit with two new states.
De…nition of the recursive procedure
Now, we de…ne the procedure. Suppose that at some point, we have de…ned mapping for some subset of S [ f0; m + 1g in such a way that (a) is monotonic on this subset, (b) maps this subset on itself; clearly, the last property allows us to write the continuation values of players from the states in this subset as V i (s), naturally de…ned as
Given a non-empty interval (a; b) (i.e., one where b a 2), the procedure extends the de…nition of on this interval so that the two properties above a preserved. After completing the procedure for (0; m + 1), we obtain a monotonic mapping .
Take a non-empty interval (a; b), with (a) = a and (b) = b de…ned and (c) for c 2 (a; b)
unde…ned. De…ne continuation utilities for s = a; b as in (A1) . In what follows, we construct "candidate"extension~ of on (a; b), and we will be denoting "candidate"continuation utilities
where~ is de…ned on fa; bg to equal . When constructing the "candidate"mapping~ (and the "real" mapping later), the following formal construction is useful.
De…nition of "Extension of~ on s using Z"
Let us …rst de…ne the function x (T ), which for a nonempty collection of states T returns the one closest to state x (and if two are equidistant, if returns the minimum. Formally, we can write x (T ) = arg min y2T jy x + 0:1j .
Suppose we have a collection of states Z [a; b], for which~ (and thusṼ ) have already being de…ned. Let s 2 (a; b) n Z. When we say "extend~ on s using Z,"we mean de…ning~ (s)
as an element of Z [ fsg in the following way. Take the subset Y Z which is de…ned by
If Y = ?, then de…ne~ (s) = s. Otherwise, consider the protocol s . We start with the last agenda-setter s Ks in this protocol and move backward to the …rst one s 1 , assigning the "proposal" to each of the agenda-setters. Denote q Ks+1 = s. Then proposal q j is de…ned, recursively, for j from K s down to 1, as follows. Let Y j be a subset of Y de…ned by
and let
where function y is used to resolve indi¤erences in a certain deterministic way). Intuitively, agenda-setter s j considers the set Y j of proposals that may be accepted, given that the alternative that would otherwise prevail is q j+1 , and of those, he chooses the most preferred one (and if none may be accepted, then the alternative for the previous stage should be q j = q j+1 ). After completing the above procedure for the given state s, de…ne~ (s) = q 1 . (It is worth noting that if Y = ?, the procedure would deliver q 1 = s, and so~ (s) = q 1 would hold in that case, too.
We considered this case separately for clarity.) Now, having extended~ on s using Z, we extend V on s by using the standard formula (A2).
The state q 1 determined through the procedure above (for the case Y 6 = ?) may be described in a simpler, albeit less intuitive way. In the general version of the game (with general transitions), it is simpler the state in Y which is most preferred by the last agenda-setter 
End of de…nition of "Extension of~ on s using Z"
We are now ready to construct the candidate mapping~ , starting from sides of the interval (a; b). If b a = 2, then extend~ on a + 1 using fa; bg. Then de…ne (a + 1) =~ (a + 1), and de…ne V (a + 1) according to (A1). Clearly, regardless of the value of~ (a + 1) (which may be a, a + 1, or b), mapping is preserved as monotonic, and maps [a; b] into itself. This ends the procedure for interval (a; b).
If b a > 2, then we start with the side where was de…ned earlier (for consistency, we assume that (0) was de…ned earlier than (m + 1)). Suppose that (a) was de…ned earlier. Then we start with state a + 1. Extend~ on a + 1 using fsg. If~ (a + 1) = a + 1 (or b (a + 1) = 2), then stop, otherwise proceed with a + 2. Here, we de…ne mapping~ for states a + 2; a + 3; : : :
by extending~ on a + k using [a; a + k 1]. This stops after we have encountered a 0 such that either~ (a 0 ) = a 0 or a 0 = b 2 (i.e., we have de…ned~ for all but the last s 2 (a; b)). In either case, a 0 denotes the rightmost state for which~ was de…ned, and by construction a 0 2 (a; b).
We now perform a similar procedure starting from the right side of the interval (a; b). 
It is trivial to show that the set in (A5) is nonempty: indeed, take the state most preferred (on [a 0 ; b 0 ]) by min M a 0 and denote it by c 1 (or take the leftmost of such states in the case of indi¤erence), then take the state most preferred by min M c 1 and denote it c 2 . clearly, the sequence fc j g is nondecreasing (by Assumption 3 and strict increasing di¤erences property) and therefore must stabilize, and the limit belongs to the set. Once again, the min is added to ensure that the procedure is deterministic. Now, we have c 2 [a 0 ; b 0 ] (a; b); let (c) = c and de…ne V i (c) for all players using (A1). We thus obtain two intervals (a; c) and (c; b), both of which contain less elements than (a; b) which we are considering, and at least one of them is nonempty. On the ends of these intervals, has been de…ned, and it leaves these ends …xed. On the interior of these intervals, has not been de…ned. We then run the procedure for these two intervals (if one is empty, we skip it), and thus extend mapping on (a; c) and (c; b), so that maps 
Nonrecursive case
The other case to consider is where either~ (a 0 ) < a 0 or~ (b 0 ) > b 0 . If so, we must necessarily have b 0 a 0 = 1 by construction. We now rede…ne mapping~ for some states so as to construct mapping . First, take state a 0 , and rede…ne~ (a 0 ) (andṼ i (a 0 )) by extending~ on a 0 using [a; b] n fa 0 g. We have two possibilities.
Suppose …rst that~ (a 0 ) a 0 . If so, for states a 0 + 1; a 0 + 2; : : : we repeat the same procedure:
rede…ne~ (a 0 + k) andṼ i (a 0 + k) by extending~ on a 0 + k using [a; b] n fa 0 + kg. We stop either when we have rede…ned~ for state b 1 or when we have obtained~ (a + k) a + k.
In the other case, where~ (a 0 ) > a 0 , we perform a symmetric procedure: unless a 0 1 = a, we take states a 0 1; a 0 2; : : : and rede…ne~ (a 0 k) andṼ i (a 0 k) by extending~ on a 0 k using [a; b] n fa 0 kg. We stop either when we have rede…ned~ for state a + 1 or when we have obtained~ (a k) a + k.
In either case, we now have~ andṼ de…ned on (a; b). Let (s) =~ (s) for all s 2 (a; b), and let V i (s) =Ṽ i (s) for all s 2 (a; b) and all i 2 N . By construction, maps (a; b) to [a; b] . It remains to prove that is monotonic.
Proof that is monotonic
To prove that is monotonic, it su¢ ces to prove that at each stage~ is monotonic. We do this by induction. The base is obvious: when we extend~ on a + 1 using fag, we get (a + 1) 2 fa; a + 1g, and in both cases monotonicity is preserved.
Step. This follows from the construction of~ .
End of de…nition of the recursive procedure
Now, let (0) = 0, (m + 1) = m + 1, and de…ne V i (0) and V i (m + 1) using (A1). We no apply the recursive procedure to (0; m + 1), and obtain a monotonic mapping that maps S to [0; m + 1]. Given that utilities of players at states 0 and m + 1 are de…ned in a way that makes these players the worst for all players, it is impossible to get~ (s) 2 f0; m + 1g (and thus (s) 2 (0; m + 1)) for any s 2 S. Consequently, is a monotonic mapping from S to S.
Step 2: Proof that mapping may be supported in equilibrium.
The idea of the proof is simple. We suppose that in a MPE, continuation utilities (after the end of the current period) are given by (A1). Take any state s 2 S, and for a period t which starts with s t 1 = s as a status quo, we consider a truncated game which has the timing of within-period game, and payo¤s given by V i (s 0 ) if s 0 is the state s t determined during the game.
We prove that there is a MPE in pure strategies in this game in which s 0 = (s) is accepted (or, if (s) = s, a MPE in pure strategies where no proposals are accepted).
We prove this statement by contradiction. Denote the set of states for which there does not exist such MPE by S 0 ; suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that S 0 is nonempty. De…ne mapping : S ! S as follows. For s 2 S n S 0 , let (s) = (s). For s 2 S 0 , take some MPE in pure strategies of the truncated game (MPE means, in particular, that strategies of players do not depend on the prior proposals that were rejected). We can choose an MPE that satis…es the following properties. First, any voter votes against any proposal whenever he is indi¤erent (even if this is his own proposal). Second, in the general version of the game, the last agenda-setter The …rst thing to notice is that, since is monotonic, then the single-crossing property holds not just for fu i (s)g s2S i2N , but also for fV i (s)g s2S i2N . Indeed, for i > j and x > y,
As a result, V i (x) > V i (y) for a winning coalition in s if and only if this is true for all players in M s (if x > y, all players to the right of M s will satisfy this inequality, provided that some player in M s does, and if x < y, all players to the left of M s will). It is now trivial to show that whatever (s) is, it is impossible that there exists s 0 such that
The choice of (s) above guarantees, as one can easily see, several properties. First, if for all s 0 2 S there is at least one player i 2 M s with V i (s 0 ) V i (s), then (s) = s (this median voter will vote against any proposal, as may be easily seen with backward induction, and if he does, then no proposal will get a winning coalition of votes). Second, in the general version of the game, no proposal will be accepted until the last round, where, if (s) 6 = s, then (s) is proposed and accepted (and if (s) = s, then s prevails). Indeed, due to the property established earlier, any earlier proposal will be blocked by at least one player in M s .
By de…nition of set S 0 , (s) 6 = (s) for s 2 S 0 . Let us then de…ne S 0 L = fs 2 S 0 : (s) < sg, S 0 0 = fs 2 S 0 : (s) = sg, and S 0 R = fs 2 S 0 : (s) > sg.
R , at least one of these sets is nonempty.
Case with deviation to self
Suppose …rst that S 0 0 is nonempty. Take s 2 S 0 0 , then (s) 6 = s = (s). However, by construction of mapping , (s) 6 = s is only possible when~ (s) 6 = s in the last de…nition of~ for the step of the recursive procedure where (s) was de…ned. This, in turn, is only possible
for all i 2 M s . Notice that the recursive procedure is such that after (s) was (re)de…ned for the last time,Ṽ i (s) (and henceṼ i ~ (s) ) remain unchanged, and
for all i 2 M s , and thus V i ( (s)) > V i (s) for all i 2 M s . But the last condition means that
if (s) < s). Consequently, if (s) is ever proposed along the path of the SPE, it must be accepted. Since (s) = s, it must never be proposed (the possibility that s is accepted at a stage before (s) is proposed is easy to rule out, as any proposal s 0 accepted before (s) must
, and s does not satisfy this condition). However, then any player i 2 M s , in the subgame where he is the agenda-setter (which may be on or o¤ the equilibrium path) is better o¤ proposing (s), as it will be accepted. This is impossible in an equilibrium, hence, S 0 0 must be empty.
Case with deviation upwards
Now suppose that S 0 0 is empty, but S 0 R is nonempty (the case where S 0 L is nonempty is treated similarly). Let s = max S 0 R . Let us …rst rule out the possibility that (s 0 ) = s 0 for some s 0 2 (s; (s)) (this is only relevant for the general version of the game since when only one-step transitions are allowed, the corresponding interval is empty). By construction of (s) for this case, we must have V max Ms ( (s)) > V max Ms (s 0 ). Indeed, if in the opposite case, we would 
In this case, we get a contradiction with that (s) is accepted in states s. If the other case, where the inequality is not strict, we must have that M s 0 is a singleton (if min M s 0 is indi¤erent, higher players must prefer a transition to (s)), and s 0
, and also js (s 0 )j < (s) s (this is obvious if (s 0 ) > s, while if (s 0 ) s it follows from that s and s 0 both lie on [ (s 0 ) ; (s)], s 0 (s 0 ) (s) s 0 , and s < s 0 ). By construction of (s), in that case, the last proposer s Ks may not propose (s) (but rather (s 0 ) or some other state). This contradiction …nishes the proof that we cannot have (s 0 ) = s 0 for some s 0 2 (s; (s)).
Now, consider the stage of the procedure where (s) was assigned. There, we started with some interval (a; b), and proceeded to assign for some or for all states on this interval. There were three possibilities.
Trivial subcase
In the trivial case, where b a = 2, we had only one state in the interval, so s = a + 1.
Then, we assigned (s) as either a, s, or b. Now, observe that (s) > s necessarily implies (s) = b: this is trivial when only one-step transitions are allowed, and when general transitions are allowed it follows from the previously established result, as (b) = b and b would otherwise lie between s and (s). Notice, however, that (s) = s is also impossible, as we have
for all i 2 M s , and this would imply
) for all such i, which means that
The remaining possibility that (s) = a is also ruled out by close inspection of how~ is extended on s.
Recursive subcase
Consider now the recursive case; this implies, by construction that ( Consider the state (s), and the sequence ( (s)) ; 2 ( (s)) ; : : : At least one element of this sequence must exceed b 0 (because otherwise the entire sequence lies in [s; b], and among these states, state s is the most preferred state for at least one player in M s , which means that (s)
would not be chosen in this case). Given the properties of mappings and , it is impossible that (x) = x for some x 2 (s; b 0 ]. This already implies that once we moved to extending on (s; b), we must have found ourselves in the nonrecursive case: indeed, while de…ning~ on b 1; b 2; : : :
we would proceed at least as far as when we were considering the whole interval (a; b), i.e., at least until b 0 , and therefore if the case were recursive, we would pick some x 2 (s; b 0 ] and de…ned (x) = x, which contradicts what we showed previously. But since we were in the nonrecursive case on the interval (s; b), then we must have obtained a 00 and b 00 (we use double primes to avoid confusion with a 0 and b 0 of the interval (a; b)) such that s < a 00 < a 00 + 1 = b 00 b 0 < b.
The remainder of the procedure had some of values of~ rede…ned, but never it is possible that (x) 6 = x switches to~ (x) = x. This proves that for any x 2 (s; b), (x) 6 = x. This also implies that there is some state z 2 (s; b] such that for x 2 (s; b), x < z implies s (x) < x and x z implies x < (x) b.
Suppose we only one-step transitions are allowed. Then (s) = s + 1. Either z = s + 1 or z > s + 1. In the former case, we have (x) = x + 1 for all x 2 (s; b). But notice that s b 0 . This means that when we started to de…ne~ on b 1; b 2; : : : ; the reason for our stopping could not be that we reached a point where~ (x) = x, since at each stage up to s, moving one step right would be better than staying at status-quo for all quasi-median voters (this follows from (x) = x + 1 for all x 2 (s; b) and (s) = s + 1). But this means that we stopped because reached a 0 + 1, and in that case we cannot be in the recursive case. This contradiction means z = s + 1 is impossible. If, however, z > s + 1, then (s) = s + 1, and (s + 1) = s. It is easy to see that this implies that u i (s + 1) > u i (s) for all i 2 M s . However, to de…ne (s + 1) = s, already knowing that (s) = s, we must have u i (s) > u i (s + 1) for all i 2 M s+1 . Given Assumption 3, this violates strict increasing di¤erences property (Assumption 1). Since this case is also ruled out, this proves that we cannot be in the recursive case if we are considering only one-step transitions.
Now suppose we allow general transitions. For
and S 0 0 = ?, as we established earlier). This means that for each such state x there is state y such that V i (y) > V i (x) for all i 2 M x (this is true both if (x) = (x) and if (x) 6 = (x)). Hence, in all cases (x) is chosen as the state most preferred by one player in M x (namely, x Kx ) subject to that it is also preferred to x by the rest (with a particular rule to break indi¤erences, given by function in (A3)). But then it is easy to see that (x) must be a nondecreasing sequence.
Then (s + 1) (s) > s, and, combined with (s + 1) 6 = s + 1, we have (s + 1) > s + 1.
We can similarly prove that (x) > x for all x 2 [s; b), and since s is the largest element of S 0 R , we must also have (x) = (x) > x for all x 2 (s; b).
We now considered a general version of the game and proceed similarly to the case where only one-step transitions are allowed. Since we are in the recursive case, we must have (b 0 ) = b 0 .
With (x) > x for all x 2 (s; b), we must have b 0 s, but since s b 0 , we have b 0 = s. But (s) > s implies that we should not have stopped at b 0 = s. This contradiction proves that we cannot be in the recursive case in this general version of the game as well.
Nonrecursive subcase
Finally, consider the nonrecursive case; then any relation between (s) and s is possible.
However, we know that for all x 2 (a; b), (x) was assigned at this round of the recursive procedure. Notice also that it is impossible that (s + 1) s + 1: this would mean that (s) was considered as an alternative at state s when (s) was chosen (i.e., when~ was de…ned for the last time), but was not chosen, and hence it should not be picked when choosing (s).
Consequently, (s + 1) < s + 1, and this brings an immediate contradiction when only onestep transitions are allowed. Indeed, (s) = s + 1 would mean that V i (s + 1) > V i (s) for a winning coalition of players in M s . But (s + 1) = s implies (s + 1) = s (S 0 0 is empty and s is the largest element of S 0 R ), and thus V i (s) > V i (s + 1) for a winning coalition of players in M s+1 which is impossible as V satis…es the strict increasing di¤erences property.
In the version of the game in general transitions, notice that (x) is nondecreasing in x (as we proved earlier), and thus (s + 1) (s) > s. Hence, (s + 1) s + 1, and this, combined with (s + 1) < s + 1, implies that s + 1 2 S 0 . But S 0 0 is empty, and thus (s + 1) > s + 1. But this contradicts that s is the largest element of S 0 R . This contradiction proves that we cannot be in the recursive case (regardless of whether one-step transitions are general transitions are allowed) and thus S 0 R = ? in both versions.
Case with deviation downwards
Now consider the remaining case, where both S 0 0 and S 0 R are empty, but S 0 L is nonempty. We obtain a similar contradiction, and this means that S 0 L must be empty. We have thus proved that S 0 must be empty, and therefore may be supported in a MPE. This proves that in the nonstochastic case, there exists a MPE in pure strategies with a monotonic transition mapping.
Step 3. Extending the proof for the stochastic case.
The proof proceeds by induction by the number of state which are in S but not in L. The base is trivial, as then we are in the nonstochastic case, and the existence of MPE in pure strategies with monotonic transition mapping was already proved in this case.
First, we introduce some extra notation. For any set of available states L, let
Let us denote the transition mapping if the set of available states is L by L , and let us denote the continuation utilities if the current set of available states is L, and a decision to transit to (or stay in) state s has just been made by
. For consistency in formulas, let us denote
is not a subset of S (i.e., contains either 0 or m + 1) for all s 2 [0; m + 1]; these will always be multiplied by 0 below.
Step. Suppose that we have proved the existence of MPE in pure strategies with a monotonic transition mapping for all proper supersets of L (which are subsets of S), and obtained continuation utilities. Let us now prove the same if the set of available states is L. We can write the continuation utility in the following way:
Now, if we denotẽ
then we can write the continuation utility as
Let us now …nd a MPE L in pure strategies with monotonic transition map for a game without shocks, with utilities given by fũ i (s)g s2S i2N and discount factor~ . The existence of such equilibrium has already been proved, as fũ i (s)g s2S i2N satisfy the strict increasing di¤erences condition, as may be easily shown. It is evident that the strategies taken from L before any shock happens, combined with strategies found on the earlier stages of the induction played after a shock occurs, will constitute a MPE of the game. This MPE will be in pure strategies and with monotonic transition map. This proves the induction step, and completes the proof of Part 1.
Part 2. This part is proved for the version in which only one-step transitions are allowed, and we start with the nonstochastic case. Suppose not, then there are two states x and y such that x < y but (x) > (y). Since only transitions to adjacent states are allowed, this means that y = x + 1 and (x) = y, (y) = x. For any player i, we have
Let us …rst prove that u i (y) u i (x) for all i 2 M x . To do this, let us consider all stages in protocol where proposal y is made and is accepted. Let k (1 k K x ) be the last such stage.
There are two possibilities.
First case. If y is rejected in this stage (i.e., in the subgame starting after rejection), there is no transition, and the status quo x prevails. This means that mappings, it must be that either 1 (y) 6 = 2 (y) for some y < x or for some y > x. In both cases, we get a similar contradiction.
We then conclude that there is a threshold a 2 [0; m] such that 1 (x) < x for all states x a (this set may be empty if a = 0) and 1 (x) > x for all states x > a (this set is empty if a = m),
and there is a threshold b 2 [0; m] such that 2 (x) < x for all states x b and 2 (x) > x for all states x > b. Now we consider the two versions of the game separately.
Version with Step-By-Step Transitions
Consider the case in which only step-by-step transitions are allowed. Suppose that a 2 and b 2, this means that 1 (2) = 2 (2) = 1. Let us modify the instantaneous payo¤s of players in the following way:ũ
unde…ned if s = 1,
De…ne~ 1 (x) = 1 (x) and~ 2 (x) = 2 (x) for all x > 2; this already means that~ 1 (x) and be supported by MPE in a game with a set of states smaller than m. This is a contradiction, proving that either a 2 f0; 1g or b 2 f0; 1g.
We can similarly prove that either a 2 fm 1; mg or b 2 fm 1; mg. Notice that a 6 = b (otherwise 1 = 2 ). Without loss of generality, assume a < b. Since the possibility that m = 2 may be ruled out trivially, we have that a 2 f0; 1g and b 2 fm 1; mg. Hence, there exists x such that 1 (x) > x > 2 (x) (this would be true for any x : 2 x m 1). This is impossible if states that are preferred to x for a quasi-median voter may lie on only one side of x, hence we only need to consider the case where the sets of quasi-median voters are singletons. Now, let x denote the state that maximizesũ i (s) for player M a+1 (let M a+1 denote the player rather than the set here; generically, the state is unique) and let y denote the state that maximizesũ i (s) for player M b . It is easy to see that x > 2 and y < m 1. In addition, by Assumption 3, x y, so 2 < x y < m 1, and m 5. But then on the interval [x; y], there is a state z which is most favored by its quasi-median voter. For this state, we must have 1 (z) = 2 (z) = z, which is a contradiction. This completes the proof for the version of the game in which only step-by-step transitions are allowed.
Version With General Transitions
Assume, without loss of generality, that a < b. Notice that for x a and for x > b, we must Part 2. Take a monotonic transition mapping , then fV i (s)g s2S i2N computed as (A1) satisfy the strict increasing di¤erences property. Now suppose, to obtain a contradiction, that (x) = y (where x = y is possible), but there exists z such that V i (z) > V i (y) for a winning coalition in x. Consider the stages of the protocol in state x from 1 to K x . There are two possibilities.
First, suppose that at no stage of the protocol an alternative that is a Condorcet winner is accepted. Then take some i 2 M x and take stage d of the protocol where player i makes a proposal. If no proposal is accepted at this stage, then there will be a transition to some state a (where a may equal x, in which case there is no transition). In the case under consideration, there are proposals that a winning coalition prefers to a; let us pick one (or one of those) that maximizes V i (s) among such s, and call it b. Then b is a Condorcet winner: if some other state c had V j (c) > V j (b) for a winning coalition in x, then it would hold for all j 2 M x , and thus Second, suppose that at some stage d of the protocol a Condorcet winner b is accepted. We proceed by backward induction. In the subgame starting from the previous stage, a Condorcet winner must be chosen as well (it may be either b or some state a satisfying V i (a) V i (b) for all i 2 M x , but in both cases this state is a Condorcet winner). We can then proceed to prove that in subgame starting from the …rst stage, a Condorcet winner must be chosen. But this contradicts the assumption that y is not a Condorcet winner. This proves the implication.
Part 3. Suppose that MPE is such that the transition mapping consists of Condorcet winners. We need to prove that is monotonic. We …rst prove that it is acyclic, and then …nish the proof by showing that it is monotonic, too.
Proof that is acyclic.
Let us start by proving that is acyclic. Suppose not, and there is a cycle of length d, and let y be the largest state of the cycle. Also, denote z = (y) and x = d 1 (y) (and so (x) = y);
note that x and z may coincide if d = 2. Let us prove that fV i (s)g s2fy;zg i2N
satis…es the strict increasing di¤erences property, i.e., that V i (y) V i (z) is increasing in i. We have (note that
As u i (y) u i k (y) is increasing in i for all 1 k d 1, so does the sum. Now, as (x) = y and y is a Condorcet winner, it cannot be that V i (z) > V i (y) for a winning coalition of players. But, given the strict increasing di¤erences we have established, this means that for at least one i 2 M x we have
it would be true for a winning coalition in x). Given the strict increasing di¤erences property, we must have that for all j 2 M y , V i (z) V i (y). But since (y) = z and z is a Condorcet winner, we must have that V j (z) V j (y) for some j 2 M y , and for this player j, V j (y) = V j (z).
Generically, this does not hold, and thus we have proved that generically, is acyclic.
Proof that is monotonic.
Suppose that there are two states, x and y, such that x < y, but (x) > (y). Without loss of generality, we may assume that k (x) k (y) for all k 2 (to achieve this, we can pick x and y such that the sum of steps it takes j (x) Notice that preferences satisfy the strict increasing di¤erences condition (Assumption 1).
Winning coalitions are de…ned is follows: in state A, player 1 is the dictator, in state B, players 2 and 3 can make decisions together, but none of them alone is su¢ cient (i.e., the two winning coalitions are f1; 2g and f1; 2; 3g), in state C, player 2 is the dictator, and in state D, player 3 is the dictator. In this way, both Assumption 3 and Assumption 4 are satis…ed.
The protocol (same in each state) is assumed to be as (2; 1; 3); i.e., player 2 is the …rst to make a proposal, player 1 is the second, and player 3 is the last. The discount factor = 0:5.
In all states except state B, there is one player who is the dictator, and he likes that state best.
Hence, in those states no transition may happen, i.e., (A) = A, (C) = C, and (D) = D.
Now consider (B).
It is easy to see that a transition must happen, and only transition to A or C is possible. Indeed, B cannot be stable as in this case player 2 could propose moving to C, and it would be accepted. Likewise, if a transition to D is impossible: if it were the case, then, by backward induction, in state B the last proposer 3 would indeed propose it, then one stage before, player 1 would propose moving to A and this would be accepted, and player 2 in the …rst stage would not be able to (nor willing to) enforce D. Hence, the two remaining possibilities to consider are (B) = A and (B) = C.
First, suppose (B) = C. If so, in the subgame where player 3 is making a proposal (which, if rejected, will lead to staying in B for one more period), can propose his favorite state D, and it will be accepted, because for player 1, 40 > (1 + 70) =2, and for player 2, 65 > (1 + 90) =2
(recall the discount factor is = 0:5). In the previous stage, if player 1 proposes his favorite state A, it will be accepted, as both player 1 and player 2 prefer A to D, and therefore player 1 will indeed do so. Now, in the …rst state player 2 is unable make a di¤erent proposal that would be accepted, as player 1 is a veto player, and he is getting his favorite state A if the game moves to the next stage. Hence, (B) = C necessarily implies (B) = A, which is impossible.
Finally, suppose (B) = A. In that case, player 3, in the subgame where he makes the proposal, faces a problem. If he proposes his favorite state D, it will be rejected, because for player 1, 40 < (1 + 90) =2. However, if he proposes his second-best state C, it will be accepted, as for player 1, 70 > (1 + 90) =2, and player 2 is just getting his favorite state. Consequently, player 3 will indeed propose state C and it will be accepted. Given that, there is no way for any other alternative (A in particular) to be accepted in the previous rounds, as player 2 will block any such attempt, knowing that doing so will ensure that a transition to state C will happen.
This means that (B) = A must imply (B) = C, which is impossible.
This contradiction proves that in this example with this protocol, there is no MPE in pure strategies. It should be noted that with any protocol that ends with player 1 or 2 in state B, there would be a MPE in pure strategies (and (B) = A if the last proposer is player 1, (B) = C if the last proposer is player 2). Suppose that is su¢ ciently close to 1, e.g., = 0:9, and take any protocol.
In this example, two transition mappings may be supported in MPE. In one, 1 (A) = 2 (B) = A and 1 (C) = C. In another, 2 (A) = A, 2 (B) = 2 (C) = C. This is possible because preferences are not single-peaked, and there are more than one quasi-median voters in all states.
Example 11 (Example where monotonic transition map does not exist.) There are three states A; B; C, and two players 1 and 2. The decision-making rule is unanimity in all states. Payo¤s are given by id A B C 1 2 21 20 2 1 22 25
Suppose that is not too close to 1, e.g., = 0:5. The protocol, used in both states, is the following: 1 = 1, 2 = 2 (player 1 is the …rst to propose, player 2 is the last).
Clearly, B and C are stable (player 1 will not agree to transit away from B, and player 2
will not agree to move away from C). Moreover, A must transit to C. Indeed, if C is proposed in the second (i.e., last) stage of the protocol, it will be accepted, as waiting an extra period in A is too painful for both players. Given that, player 2 can block any other transition in the …rst stage of the protocol and propose C in the second stage, thus ensuring that C is accepted. Since C yields him the highest utility, he will indeed do that. Consequently, the only equilibrium we have here is where B and C are stable, and B transits to C.
Intuitively, the reason for nonmonotonicity here is the protocol, where, even though state B is a Condorcet winner in state A, it may not be enforced, as player 2 can block it and force player 1 to agree on moving to C. Notice that there is a protocol (2 proposed …rst, followed by 1) with a monotonic transition map: here, the mapping (A) = (B) = B, (C) = C may be supported in equilibrium, as one can easily see. Also, notice that if the Strong Monotonic
Median Voter property was satis…ed, then there would exist an equilibrium with a monotonic transition mapping. For instance, if in A, the voting rule were unanimity (as in the example), but in B and C, player 2 were the dictator, then for any protocol the transition mapping would be (A) = (B) = (C) = C.
Example 12 (Example with a cyclic equilibria for a given protocol.) There are nine players and three states of the world: with 5, 7, and 9 players (the example extends trivially to the situation where states with 1 and 3 players are also available. The payo¤s of players in each of the states are given by the following table.
Player's # 5 players 7 players 9 players 1 100 10 1 2 100 10 + " 1 + 2" 3 95 100 90 4 95 100 + " 90 + 2" 5 95 100 + 2" 90 + 4" 6 1 10 100 7 1 10 + " 100 + 2" 8 1 10 + 2" 100 + 4" 9 1 10 + 3" 100 + 6"
Here, " is a small positive number, added to ensure that the (strict) single-crossing condition (Assumption 1) is satis…ed. Intuitively, there are 3 groups of players: the …rst with two players 1 and 2 who prefer smaller states, the second with three players 3, 4, and 5, who prefer the middle state, and the third with four players 6, 7, 8, and 9, who prefer larger states. Obviously, the players'utility functions are also single-peaked. Assume the following order of agenda-setters in the three states: 5 players 1; 2; 3; 4; 5 7 players 1; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 2 9 players 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 8; 9
We now prove that a cycle f5 playersg ! f7 playersg ! f9 playersg ! f5 playersg is possible, at least for discount factor not too small ( > 1=2 is su¢ cient). Let us show how, given such transition rules, it will be best responses for players to propose and vote for the required transitions. We …rst notice that with such transition rule, players have the following preferences about being in di¤erent states: Players 1; 2 f5 playersg f9 playersg f7 playersg Players 3; 4; 5 f7 playersg f5 playersg f9 playersg Players 6; 7; 8; 9 f9 playersg f7 playersg f5 playersg First, consider the state with 5 players. There, players of second group (3; 4; 5) form a majority, and they all prefer the path starting with their favorite state with 7 players. Hence, it is an equilibrium for each of these players to propose this transition and vote for it, and to block any transition proposed by players 1 or 2.
Second, consider the state with 7 players. The last player 2, if no alternative is accepted before, will o¤er to transit to 9-player state, and this will be accepted by 1; 2; 6; 7. The previous agenda-setter, 7, will also o¤er to transit to the 9-player state, and so will the previous one 6.
Before that, player 5 would propose to transit to 5-player state; earlier, player 4 would propose to preserve the 7-player status quo, and so would player 3 in the previous stage. Given that, at the …rst stage player 1 would propose to transit to the 9-player state, and this will be accepted (by players 1; 2; 6; 7). Hence in this state transition to 9-player state will indeed happen.
Third, consider the state with 9 players. Obviously, players 9; 8; 7; 6 will propose the status quo if nothing is accepted before that, as they prefer it most. Now, when player 5 makes a proposal,he realizes that if he proposes 5-player state, it will be accepted, while if he proposes 7-player one, it will be rejected in favor of status quo. Hence, he proposes 5-player state: At the previous stage, player 4 will propose 7-player state for similar reasons; before that, player 3 will propose 7-player state as well (he may propose 5-player state as well; then the proposal will be rejected). Earlier, player 2 will propose the 9-player status quo, and in the …rst stage, player 1 will propose his favorite 5-player state, and it will be accepted (by players 1; 2; 6; 7; 8; 9). This completes the proof. Take any discount factor , e.g., = 0:5, and any protocol.
Since player 1 is the dictator, we have an equilibrium where (A) = B and (B) = A, i.e., there is eternal alternation between the two states. This equilibrium has transition mapping which is nonmonotonic and cyclic. Even more, player 2 is better o¤ if the game begins at state A (and thus moves to B in the …rst period) than if the game begins at state B (and moves to less preferred A in the …rst period). This equilibrium is only possible for measure 0 of preferences.
